



CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EAST 




No. 24   June 2005REGIONAL INTEGRATION CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EAST 
EUROPE: BANKING SECTOR TRENDS 
George Stubos  
Bank of Greece 
 
Ioannis Tsikripis 
Bank of Greece 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study reviews and evaluates a particular aspect of the institution building process 
in the transition countries of Southeast Europe. The focus is the development of the 
banking sector. It is argued that banking sector development plays an integral and 
pivotal role in the successful completion of the transition process. It functions as a 
very strong integrating force contributing to the broader institution building process 
and as a pillar of future growth and development in the new market environment of 
the Balkan economies. This study concentrates on three main issues. First, it 
undertakes a brief literature review of regional integration approaches in the Balkans. 
Second, it provides an overview of the most significant changes that have taken place 
in the banking sector. Third, it reviews some structural characteristics and 
performance indicators, all of which point to considerable advancements made in this 
sector in recent years. Empirical evidence is provided showing that a substantial 
harmonisation of ownership structures and performance indicators has been achieved 
in the banking sectors of these countries initiating a convergence process toward EU 
banking structures and functions. In this regard, this study complements the findings 
of other studies focusing on various sectors of economic activity, which clearly show 
that a de facto regional and, even more so, continental integration of the Southeast 
European countries is under way. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper intends to argue that foreign banking institutions have played a 
key, and in some cases, dominant role in the restructuring, reorganisation and reform 
of the banking sector in all Balkan economies. Their role, which continues unabated, 
has contributed to the much-needed institution building process as a necessary 
advancement leading to the completion of the transition project.  
In developing this argument, this paper concentrates on the following three 
main issues. First, it undertakes a brief literature review of the theoretical 
understanding of regional economic integration as it applies to the Balkan countries
1; 
second, it provides an overview of the most significant changes that have taken place 
in the banking sector since 1989; and, third, it reviews the main ownership and 
structural characteristics as well as some selective performance indicators which point 
to the most recent advancements in this sector. 
2. Balkan Integration: Selected Theoretical Contributions  
Since 1989, concurrently with a substantial number of regional economic 
integration initiatives launched various theoretical arguments for and against Balkan 
integration have been proposed and debated
2. The relevant literature focuses on three 
main issues: the reasons why integration needs to be promoted, the obstacles 
hindering integration efforts and a critical assessment of the regional integration 
initiatives already implemented.  
  Uvalic (2001) identifies four reasons for promoting regional economic 
integration in the Balkans. First, the need to increase mutual trade through the 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Lower prices would encourage greater 
regional trade flows and compensate for the weak export performance of Balkan 
states to the West. Even a transitory impulse to trade flows, Uvalic argues, may create 
static and dynamic gains and provide strong incentives for regional development. 
                                                           
1 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. 
2 The initiatives towards regional co-operation in Central and South Eastern Europe arose as a reaction 
to two main events. First, the dissolution of the Eastern Block and the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance resulted in an institutional vacuum; in response, the Central European Initiative (1989), the 
Black Sea Economic Co-operation (1992) and the Central European Free Trade Area (1992) were 
launched. Second, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict led 
to a second wave of economic integration efforts with the Conference of Southeast European Countries 
(1996), the Southeast European Co-operative Initiative (1997), the Stability Pact (1999) and the 
Stabilisation and Association Process.   6
Second, integration can contribute to the resolution of issues that need to be addressed 
at a regional level, such as migration, infrastructure, energy, ecological damage, 
environmental issues, illegal trafficking etc. Due to the nature of these issues, which 
affect the Balkans as a whole, an attempt to resolve them unilaterally can be only 
partially successful. Third, integration can encourage investment through greater 
political and economic stability in the region. A high savings deficiency, due to 
poverty, underdevelopment and loss of confidence in the banking system, renders the 
attraction of capital from abroad especially important. Regional co-operation can 
reduce political risk, promote economic stability and increase the size of local 
markets, contributing, therefore, to investment activity. Fourth, regional integration is 
a means through which convergence and eventual integration into the European and 
the Euro-Atlantic economic and security structures can be accelerated.  
Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2002) elaborate on five reasons why the 
international community and, in particular, the EU advocate a central role for regional 
co-operation. First, the ‘prescriptive’ argument emphasizes the positive effects of 
regional interdependence and co-operation, referring to the EU as the most successful 
example of integration efforts. Second, the ‘new regionalist’ argument considers the 
transformation of the Balkans as part of a wider global effort to promote democracy 
and market economy through multilateral co-operation. Third, the ‘strategic’ 
argument considers regional co-operation as the main contributing factor to security 
and confidence-building among neighbouring states. Fourth, the ‘EU internal’ 
argument advocates the development of sub-regional co-operation (Central Europe, 
Baltic countries, Western Balkans) as a way of facilitating the broader and long-term 
EU integration process. Fifth, the ‘Southeast regional’ argument emphasizes the need 
for joint resolution of common problems and maintains that SEE countries should  
prove their ability to cooperate with their neighbours before building stronger ties 
with the EU. 
A common underlying theme in the views expressed above is the political 
motive for the implementation of integration policies. The authors acknowledge the 
fact that there are strong political reasons for promoting closer economic integration 
in the Balkans, in the hope of enhancing regional stability, secure peace, reduce ethnic 
tensions and prepare these countries for their eventual incorporation into the EU.    7
On the issue of economic obstacles that hinder the efforts towards regionalism, 
Kyrkilis and Nikolaidis (2001) argue that certain limitations derive from both the 
demand and the supply sides of the economies of the region. In particular, demand-
side limitations arise from the small population size of the Balkan countries and the 
low levels of development and per capita GDP, which undermine their ability to 
exploit economies of scale. Further limitations are brought about by the constrained 
local demand and the shift of exports to the EU market rather than the regional one. 
On the supply side, Balkan production is structured in such a way as to take advantage 
of its relatively cheap but adequately trained labour force and, thus, specialises in 
low-to-medium technology sectors. Lack of complementarity, overlapping structures 
of production and similarities in the comparative advantages of Balkan states reduce 
the potential for significant gains from inter-industry trade. 
Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2002:11-13) emphasize the political 
aspect of the obstacles to economic integration. In particular, they argue that 
geographic proximity, the existence of many borders and the massive displacement of 
population have all combined to facilitate regional co-operation in informal and, to a 
considerable extent, criminalised economic activities. The informal sector has 
hindered the normalisation of relations among countries in the region, undermined 
economic and political institutions and obstructed the process of regional integration. 
  Lopandic (2001a) also describes a number of other obstacles to economic 
integration efforts in the Balkans noting, in particular, the lack of tradition in 
multilateral co-operation and their peripheral position with respect to Europe. 
Furthermore, the divergences of Balkans states in terms of their national, political and 
economic development hinder their foreign investment prospects and diminish their 
regional integration potential (Stubos 1993). 
  An important part of the literature engages in a critique of regional economic 
integration initiatives since the dissolution of the Eastern Block (CEI, BSEC, CEFTA, 
SECI, SP, SAP)
3. The underlying view of this approach is that economic integration 
initiatives in the Balkans, with the possible exception of the Stability Pact and the 
SAPs, have been progressing at a slow pace failing to produce concrete results in 
                                                           
3 CEI: Central European Initiative; BSEC: Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation; 
CEFTA: Central European Free Trade Agreement; SECI: Southeast European Co-operation Initiative; 
SP: Stability Pact; SAP: Stabilisation and Association Process.   8
promoting economic development, modernising institutions and stabilising the region 
politically. A distinction is typically made between the micro and the macro levels of 
their effectiveness. Although it can be argued that, at the micro level, regional 
initiatives have had a positive effect, it is widely accepted that these initiatives and 
forms of multilateral co-operation have not, to date, helped Balkan countries to further 
integration with the EU or to critically change the political, economic or social 
environment in the region. Lopandic (2001b:8) writes that ‘a major shortcoming of 
economic initiatives has been the lack of coherence, with each regional co-operation 
arrangement [having] its own autonomous development and agenda, thus often 
resulting in activities overlapping each other’. 
3. Institution Building and the European Trajectory  
The European Commission has consistently made clear its objective to assist 
the Balkans to reach first candidate status and, eventually, full EU membership. The 
European Council in Feira, in June 2000, confirmed this objective in the clearest 
terms possible. The Copenhagen Council, in December 2002, reaffirmed this 
perspective. In 2003, the Commission inaugurated the Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAP) outlining specifically the required changes leading to pre-accession 
status. At the Thessaloniki Summit of the EU, in June 2003, the leaders of the Balkan 
countries were invited for a joint session during which it was confirmed that the SAP 
will be the last contractual agreement between association and membership. Together 
with this kind of political commitment, a set of new instruments have been established 
over the last a few years aiming, primarily, to enhance the institution building 
capacity of the Balkan countries. The CARDS, TAIO and EP
4 are all programmes 
conceived, activated and implemented for this purpose.  
The six Balkan countries seem to have fully adopted the view that the nature 
and character of their economic restructuring and economic integration will be 
determined by an economic rationality and logic imposed upon them by their EU 
trajectory (Stubos 1997). Toward this common objective, they advance at different 
speeds. Bulgaria and Romania have already signed agreements with the EU and are 
working on an expected date of accession in 2007. For the other countries, the process 
for gaining candidate status leading eventually to full membership to EU needs to go 
                                                           
4 CARDS: Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation, TAIEO: 
Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office, EP: European Partnership.   9
through the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) which are negotiated 
with each country separately. Croatia and FYR Macedonia signed such agreements in 
2001. Albania is currently negotiating its SAA, Bosnia and Herzegovina have been 
given a conditional go-ahead to start SAA negotiations, while Serbia and Montenegro 
have not yet started negotiating due to outstanding issues regarding their 
Constitutional Charter. 
Gligorov (2003:375) argues that a defining characteristic for a country 
aspiring to be European is not only its geographic location, but even more 
importantly, the sharing with EU countries of some fundamental values and 
institutions. He points out (2004:11) that the European integration of the Balkan 
countries needs to go through  both a de facto and a de jure process. The de jure side 
may have to wait a while longer but the de facto side is already proceeding in many 
sectors of economic activity. The available data on trade clearly show that for the 
Balkan transition economies bilateral relations with the EU are more important than 
relations among them. Regional trade, which has been praised as a desirable option 
and even as a prerequisite for sustainable growth and development, has shown to be 
persistently weak with small yearly fluctuations  (Christie 2004). 
Tables 1 and 2 record inter-regional trade between the SEE countries and 
between themselves and the EU. With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all 
other countries depend for at least half of their imports and exports on the EU. In the 
case of Albania these figures are over 70% and 90%, respectively. In the case of 
Albania Bulgaria and Romania, inter-regional trade volume is particularly small. At 
times, it does not exceed 2 or 3 percent of total trade, which is atypical and highly 
unusual for countries in such geographic proximity. What these tables do not show is 
the size of illegal regional trade
5 and the fact that Italy, Greece and Germany are the 




                                                           
5 Empirical evidence suggests that there are very significant illegal trade flows in the Balkans. High 
tariffs and taxes combined with lax implementation practices tend to aggravate this problem. It has 
been estimated that, in some cases, illegal trade may exceed 30% of GDP annually (Gligorov and 
Holzner 2004). 
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Table 1: Imports of SEE Countries from EU-15 and other SEE countries (% of total) 
Year  ALB BiH BUL  ROM  FYROM  SEM   
   SEE EU SEE EU SEE EU SEE EU SEE EU SEE EU 
1998  6.3 79.0 43.4  33.4 2.8 46.1 1.1 57.9 20.4 52.8 14.1  45.1 
1999  7.0 77.6 32.8  37.6 2.2 50.9 0.9 62.7 20.7 50.7 14.6  38.3 
2000  6.1 75.6 21.4  33.2 4.4 44.0 0.7 63.0 19.8 49.4 20.9  40.9 
2001  5.7 77.4 27.9  37.2 3.0 49.0 1.4 63.0 18.2 46.1 21.8  49.1 
2002  6.1 77.6 22.8  39.0 2.5 50.5 1.1 63.9 11.1 53.0 15.3  52.0 
2003  6.5 70.8 n/a 37.3 2.9 49.5 n/a 57.7 19.7 43.7 n/a 42.6 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Database, National Central Banks, WTO database 
 
Table 2: Exports of SEE Countries from EU-15 and other SEE countries (% of total) 
Year  ALB BiH BUL  ROM  FYROM  SEM   
   SEE EU SEE EU SEE EU SEE EU SEE EU SEE EU 
1998  2.3 88.8 54.1  33.8 7.0 51.5 2.9 64.6 19.2 51.8 33.0  38.0 
1999  2.1 89.9 42.9  42.3 8.6 53.3 2.9 66.0 20.4 50.9 33.8  34.3 
2000  2.1  93.4 30.5 47.6 12.6 51.2 2.3 60.6 30.9 46.1 28.2  37.7 
2001  2.8 91.8 31.2  46.3 9.8 55.2 3.1 65.1 38.3 41.4 28.7  47.0 
2002  2.2 90.0 37.2  51.1 9.3 56.1 2.9 66.3 20.0 40.0 31.1  54.0 
2003  3.1 93.3 n/a 40.9 8.4 56.6 n/a 67.9 32.2 54.6 n/a 43.6 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Database, National Central Banks, WTO database 
 
The increasing role of the EU in the Balkan economies is critical not only in 
relation to trade but also in terms of bringing about changes in institutions and 
policies. The peculiarity in this regard lies in the fact that, under EU guidance and 
financial assistance, institutions and policies in certain sectors are becoming 
homogenised in terms of their function, regulation and efficiency. One would assume 
that the establishment of a modern and viable banking system fulfils this criterion and, 
in turn, brings the aspiring Balkan countries a step closer to their western neighbours. 
4. Financial Integration: A Theoretical Comment 
The completion of reforms and restructuring in the banking sector is 
considered to be a critical and integral element of the transition process (Doukas et al. 
1998; Mullineux 1998; Walter 1998). A well developed and properly functioning and 
supervised banking system is a prerequisite for the development of the real economy, 
because it affects some of its key functions ranging from capital accumulation to the   11
channelling of funds to households and enterprises (Allen and Gale 2000; Mishkin 
2001). 
As noted by Stepic (2004:84), ‘financial intermediation and structural changes 
are strongly interconnected’. A well-developed banking system can be the initiator of 
many other restructuring projects. It provides the confidence needed for local and 
foreign capital to invest in new or existing companies; it brings in know-how, 
technology and modern management skills; it provides the much needed start-up 
capital, especially to small- and medium-sized companies. All in all, a viable banking 
system is considered an important precondition for dynamic and sustainable growth. 
The development of a banking sector seems to be also a part of a longer and 
broader process. Many recent studies have concluded that during the past few decades 
banking systems have become more globally integrated. The main contributing 
factors are the removal of regulatory barriers, advances in technology allowing for 
better management of financial institution and assets globally or regionally and the 
growth of the activities of multinational corporations (Berger and Smith 2003).  
The entry of foreign banks, particularly in a less developed banking market, 
brings with it significant benefits (Konopielko 2003; De Haas and Lelyveld 2002; 
Mero and Valentinyi 2003). These benefits can be seen from the perspective of the 
economy as a whole or from the perspective of the banking sector itself. In the first 
case, the establishment and functioning of foreign banks allow a country to engage in 
‘consumption smoothing’ and safeguard economic stability. It attracts more financial 
resources from the international community and induces national governments to 
follow more disciplined macroeconomic policies (Agenor 2001). In the second case, 
as Kraft (2004) points out, the presence of foreign banks improves the sector itself by 
introducing new products and services and by consolidating the banking sector 
through mergers and acquisitions.  
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the entry of foreign banks may 
simultaneously have some other diverse effects. While, on the one hand, they render 
national banking markets more competitive with positive welfare implications for 
banking customers, on the other hand, they reduce the profitability of domestic banks 
and, in a lot of cases, force them out of the market. Obviously, this kind a collateral 
damage is part and parcel of the consolidation process, with its own negative   12
consequences on some depositors and also on employment (Claessens, Demirguc-
Kunt, Huizinga 1998). 
Turning our attention to the Balkans, the banking sector in the late 1990s 
found itself in its worst state since 1989. After a series of consecutive crises in 
previous years, the sector remained underdeveloped and of doubtful reputation, while 
services were of poor quality and strictly limited. The level of non-performing loans 
was very high, privatisation efforts had failed and supervisory institutions were unable 
to perform their tasks. These prevailing conditions necessitated the introduction of 
radical and bold reforms for the sector to move forward again. At that time, the 
expectation and the perception prevailed in policy making circles and among the 
public at large that liberalisation and openness of the banking system could remedy its 
weaknesses and deficiencies (Bossone, Honohan, Long 2001). Under these 
conditions, the large, competitive and advanced EU banking institutions, given their 
geographic proximity to the region, made cross-border expansion and take-overs a 
rational investment choice. In the late 1990s the foreign invasion of the Balkan 
banking sector started in earnest.  
  In the following section, this study reviews and evaluates developments in the 
banking sector since 1989. Changes of the initial, particularly turbulent period are 
given in a summary form, while developments since 1998 are described in more 
detail. Various qualitative aspects of the banking sector are illuminated as it emerged 
after the second round of privatisation spearheaded by foreign institutions. These 
developments signal a major shift in the transition process from economic reform and 
reconstruction to institution building. In this regard, banking sector changes contribute 
to the broader transition project at the national level and as a means through which 
Balkan economies integrate themselves both regionally and continentally.  
5. Banking Reform 
All Balkan countries, except former Yugoslavia, emerged from the communist 
era with the legacy of a single-bank system that performed both central bank 
functions and commercial transactions. A first step in banking reform was the creation 
of a two-level banking system, separating commercial from central banking functions. 
The Balkan countries, like all other transition economies, introduced a legal and 
regulatory framework that followed the broad guidelines, standards and procedures of   13
the BIS. This development was in line with the so-called Washington consensus for 
banking reform advocated by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (Calvo and 
Frenkel 1991, Caprio and Levine 1994). 
  Reform of the financial sector in its initial phase advanced more in terms of 
quantity rather than quality. The number of financial institutions quickly multiplied 
through the privatisation of state banks and the establishment of new private 
institutions. In some countries the sector was immediately opened up to foreign 
interests as well. At the beginning, the nascent banking system faced serious 
problems. First, financial institutions found themselves functioning within an 
insufficiently regulated environment and, therefore, were improperly supervised. 
Expansion was frequently associated with improprieties, scandals and fraudulent 
schemes. Second, the dubious reputation and unreliability of the new financial 
institutions limited their ability to attract deposits and prevented the growth of their 
loan portfolios. It was difficult, therefore, to develop extensive client networks. Third, 
state banks were compelled to carry a high number of non-performing loans 
accumulated as a result of the past practice of government subsidisation programmes 
to state-run enterprises.  
  The initial phase of reforms resulted in numerous bank failures, scandals and 
transactional irregularities which questioned the very basis and viability of the 
emerging system. This deterioration coincided with and, in some cases, was caused by 
the deep economic crises that most Balkan economies experienced between 1996 and 
1998. Under these conditions, reform of the banking system ‘could not be put off any 
more’ as all major International Financial Institutions were very plainly pointing out 
(Köhler 2002:125; Lemierre 2002:18; Tumpel-Gugerell 2002:3). Governments had to 
re-think and redesign their banking reform strategy, which quickly led to new policies 
aiming to liberalise and consolidate the system in an effort to guarantee its viability 
and sustainability. It was this new policy that ushered in the penetration of the Balkan 
market by foreign banks.  
Some countries have gone further than others in liberalising and modernising 
their banking and financial systems, more often in concert with their corresponding 
transition pace. The following section provides a synoptic review of the most 
significant changes in the banking sector covering the whole transition period from 
1989 to the present.    14
 In Albania
6, banking reform started at a slow pace. In the early 1990s, the 
country was characterised by very low levels of financial intermediation, an 
inadequate legal framework for banking operations and an extensive money-
laundering problem. The system allowed for the proliferation of unsound, speculative 
investment schemes promising excessive returns on deposits. These investment 
practices became very widespread between 1994 and 1996 leading to an acute crisis 
which manifested itself at the end of this period. The shock waves caused by the 
collapse of the so-called ‘pyramid schemes’, in 1997, led to a gradual and more 
methodical restructuring of the banking sector. Successive pieces of legislation, which 
were introduced following the crisis, significantly strengthened the banking regulation 
and supervision frameworks. Capital adequacy ratios reached very high levels, 31.5% 
in 2002, compared to the required 12%. In October 2002, a deposit insurance policy 
was introduced, guaranteeing deposits of up to USD 5000, which covered about 60% 
of all deposits. With these and other relevant measures, confidence in the banking 
sector was gradually restored. 
In terms of structure and ownership, at the end of 2002, the Albanian banking 
system consisted of 13 banks of which only one, the Saving Bank (SB) was entirely 
state-owned. This depiction, however, is misleading if one considers that the SB, in 
2001, accounted for 59% of the total banking assets, while its share of deposits was 
64%. Two attempts to privatise it, in 2001 and 2002, failed. A third attempt, however, 
succeeded. At the end of 2003, the Austrian Raiffeisen ZentralBank acquired 100% of 
the SB. The privatisation process in Albania was, therefore, completed, creating 
appropriate conditions for improving competition and the quality of products and 
services offered. Though the privatisation of the Savings Bank is not expected to 
impact significantly on the level of its deposits, it is expected to increase its lending 
considerably. In 2003, two more foreign private banks began their operations in 
Albania. At the end of 2003, 16 banks were operating in the country of which 14 were 
foreign-owned. 
 In  Bosnia and Herzegovina
7 (BH), at the end of the civil war in 1995, the 
banking sector was marked by a large number of institutions, most of which were 
very small and under-capitalised. These conditions prevailed in both entities, the 
                                                           
6 Source: Bank of Albania Annual Report 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003. 
7 Source: Central Bank of Bosnia Herzegovina Annual Report 2000, 2003.   15
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH) and the Republica Srpska (RS). The 
much needed reform and restructuring of the banking sector accelerated after the 
Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CBBH), functioning as Currency Board, 
was established in June 1997. One of its key mandates was to harmonise the legal 
framework and to take measures to improve the co-ordination and co-operation 
between the two Entity Banking Agencies. The Law on Banks enacted in 1998 laid 
the foundation for a more uniform, properly supervised and functioning banking 
system.  
  Two increases in the minimum reserve capital requirement introduced in 
August 1999 and in June 2001 (reaching 7.6 million euros) profoundly affected the 
structure and ownership of the banking sector. They initiated two rounds of 
consolidation and facilitated the entry of foreign strategic investors. By 2003, the 
number of banks had been reduced to 37 from 55 in 2000. Privatisation has been 
essentially completed with all banks in the RS being privately owned while only a few 
in the FBH, performing specialised functions, are still majority state owned. In both 
Entities over 65% of banking assets are in foreign ownership. During 2002-3, the 
legal framework was strengthened further through the adoption of significant 
amendments to the Law on Banks regarding the management of banking institutions, 
the introduction of mandatory audit committees, the protection of government 
deposits and the implementation of measures against so-called ‘financial terrorism’. A 
deposit insurance programme was initiated in 2001 but was effectively enforced in 
October 2002. A year later, only 13 banks had fulfilled the conditions for 
membership; the rest were ordered to urgently introduce action plans for fulfilling the 
prudential ratios necessary for membership. The Currency Board is also actively 
trying to improve the anti-laundering policy with a single registration of commercial 
bank accounts. 
  In recent years, the banking sector in BH has been growing rapidly. Total 
assets grew from 32% of GDP in 2000 to 58% at the end of 2003. Credit from 
commercial banks towards both households and enterprises has been expanding 
rapidly, exceeding 30% per annum in 2002 and in 2003. This is occurring in spite of a 
historically bad credit culture and the lack of reliable accounting and auditing 
standards. This rate of credit expansion, incidentally, was one of the reasons why the 
Currency Board raised reserve requirement in 2001 in order to slow the rate of   16
expansion.  Deposits are also increasing as people show confidence in the banking 
system and repatriate their funds from foreign banks. 
 In  Bulgaria
8, new legislation introduced in January 1991, permitted the 
creation of new financial institutions with private domestic or foreign capital. Within 
two years of the liberalisation of the banking sector, 80 commercial banks were 
established and organised as self-managed joint-stock companies. The activities and 
lending practices of these new institutions, however, quickly became identified with 
serious irregularities and illicit financing. The lack of effective regulatory scrutiny 
made the problem endemic. During the same period state-owned banks continued, 
under government pressure, to extend loan facilities to money-losing enterprises. It is 
estimated that in 1995 alone total loses amounted to 15% of GDP. By the end of that 
year the system was insolvent. Many banks faced liquidity problems, temporarily 
alleviated through massive central bank refinancing. This consequent money creation 
affected the foreign exchange market, undermining confidence in the national 
currency and led to the devaluation of the lev/USD exchange rate from 10 in 
December 1995 to 3200 in February 1996. The annual inflation rate climbed to over 
1000%. By January 1997, one in every four banks was in receivership.  
Following the advice of the IMF, the Bulgarian government introduced a 
Currency Board accompanied by a package of structural reforms. This package 
included strict control and financial supervision of money losing state enterprises, the 
liberalisation of trade and a more rigorous privatisation policy. In July 1997, the 
Currency Board pegged the lev to the DM, took measures to restrict government 
expenditure and the activities of the Central Bank, which was permitted to provide 
only three-month loans to commercial banks. The Board’s policy was very effective 
in containing inflation, which was reduced to 1% monthly by the end of the year. The 
policy of the Board, however, did not come without cost. Bulgaria experienced a 
severe depression and GDP contracted by 7.4% in 1997, though it bounced back  with 
a 4.5% increase in 1998.  
  After six years of systematic restructuring, the banking sector in Bulgaria is 
considered well regulated and well supervised. The credibility of its institutions has 
been restored and their viability has been improved through a series of mergers and 
acquisitions. In 2003, new regulations on internal control in line with the principles of 
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the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision were adopted. At the end of that year, 
most of the 35 banks operating in the country were privately owned, while 27 were 
foreign owned. Foreign investors controlled about 84% of the total banking assets. 
Overall, the banking sector is fairly liquid, quite profitable and adequately capitalised. 
In 2003, the capital adequacy ratio was 22.2%, way over the required minimum 
(12%). Banking intermediation, however, still remains low in comparison not only to 
the western European countries but also to other Central European transition 
countries.  
 In  Romania
9, privatisation and reform in the banking sector has proceeded 
more slowly than in the rest of the region. For almost ten years (1990-1999), the level 
of intermediation was very low, the degree of concentration high (the largest four 
banks controlled more than 65% of total banking assets) and the problem of non-
performing loans to state banks unresolved. Reform measures were taken after 1999 
with the closure of a large state bank, Bancorex, the restructuring, recapitalisation and 
eventual privatisation of the Banka Agricola and the clearance of a substantial part of 
the non-performing loans. At the end of 2002, thirty-nine banking institutions were in 
operation, of which twenty-four had a majority foreign ownership. In November 
2003, the government announced the partial privatisation of Banca Commerciala 
Romana (BCR) through the sale of 12.5% to the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and another 12.5% to the EBRD. This bank alone holds almost 30% of the total 
banking assets. The Romanian government plans to reduce further its stake in BCR by 
selling to a strategic investor by 2006. 
  Banking supervision and the legal and regulatory framework have also been 
strengthened in recent years. At the beginning of 2002, new regulations were 
introduced governing the operations of saving co-operatives and the administration of 
the secondary Treasury bills and money markets. At the end of 2003, 38 banks were 
operating in the country, after the removal of the problem Columna Bank by final 
decision of the Bucharest Court. In general, after a decade of delays the banking 
sector in Romania is quickly catching up with the progress made in the other Balkan 
countries.  
                                                           
9 Source: National Bank of Romania Annual Report, 1994,1997, 1999,2000-2003.   18
 In  F.Y.R. Macedonia
10, initial banking sector reform was based on a policy of 
rehabilitation and privatisation of existing entities. Banking institutions came under 
the supervision and guidance of a government agency, which became responsible for 
clearing their balance sheets and securing adequate capitalisation. Concurrently the 
National Bank made a consistent effort to create a regulatory and supervisory 
framework for the establishment of a viable banking sector. Strict capitalisation 
requirements were introduced, money laundering was checked and measures for 
expanding credit to small- and medium-sized enterprises were implemented. 
Legislation, introduced in 2000 and 2001, created the legal framework for 
modernising and consolidating the banking sector along the lines of the European 
Union banking directives and international standards. A temporary set back caused by 
a severe economic downturn in 2001 was quickly overcome. At the end of 2002, the 
banking system of the country consisted of 20 commercial banks, of which 7 were 
foreign owned and 17 classified as saving houses.  
  Presently, the banking sector is predominantly privately owned, while the 
share of foreign ownership has increased to over 40%. Consistent efforts have 
continued for the regulation and supervision of the system, while liquidity and 
capitalisation conditions are improving. However, financial intermediation is still low 
and there are clear signs of high concentration with two banks controlling 50% of the 
total banking assets. 
 In  Serbia and Montenegro
11, the banking sector had to wait until 2001 before 
reforms getting under way.  It suffered, like all other sectors of the economy, from the 
reluctance of the Milosevic regime in the 1990s to proceed with privatisation and 
restructuring. Banking institutions remained effectively under state control and 
operated under soft budget constraints, mostly supporting money-losing enterprises. 
With an artificially maintained fixed exchange rate and official reserves estimated at 
very low levels, banking and financial conditions in former Yugoslavia remained 
difficult until the democratic transformation in 2000.  
  The banking sector emerged from the Milosevic era was insolvent with its 
liabilities well above the value of its assets. At the same time, it faced a severe 
liquidity crisis. The National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY), in collaboration with the 
                                                           
10 Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia Annual Report, 1998-2003. 
11 Source: National Bank of Serbia, Annual Report, 2003.   19
World Bank and the IMF, embarked on an ambitious restructuring policy in May 
2001. The proposed objective of this policy was to complete all necessary liquidation 
procedures for insolvent institutions and privatise the remaining banks, most of which 
were severely undercapitalised. The implementation of this policy is still under way. 
Initially, all banking institutions were categorised into three groups: healthy, solvent 
but undercapitalised and insolvent. By 2002, 28 banks (including four of the largest) 
were declared insolvent and closed. Another 50 banks (including 12 foreign owned) 
were characterised as healthy, some of which, however, were still facing serious 
capitalisation problems. Concurrently, emphasis was placed on bank privatisation, the 
strengthening of banking supervision and the enforcement of prudential rules and 
regulations. At the end of 2003, 47 banks were operating in the country, of which 16 
were foreign owned. In 2004, the Serbian government offered three large state banks 
for sale, while the largest bank of Montenegro (the Montenegro Banca) was sold to 
the Slovenian Nova Ljublianska Banca in July 2003. The intention of the NBY is to 
increase the minimum capital requirement, introduce new asset classification, 
improve internal auditing procedures, control and credit policies. Recently, a new 
accounting law was introduced, requiring all banks to implement International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). Overall, steps have been taken to improve the banking 
sector in Serbia and Montenegro, but much remains to be done, especially in the areas 
of strengthening the regulatory framework and privatising the remaining state owned 
banks. 
6. Banking System Reform Index 
  The general review of banking developments provided above shows that 
reforms have proceeded at different speed in the various Balkan countries. It is also 
fair to say that the banking sector has transformed itself substantially in the past few 
years and this improvement was the result of changes in:  
•  the privatisation of state owned banks and the closure of insolvent institutions; 
•  the writing-off of non-performing loans;  
•  the entry of foreign banks either by establishing an autonomous presence or by 
taking over local banks; 
•  the adoption of regulations according to international standards and practices; 
and,   20
•  the implementation of tighter and more effective supervision exercised by the 
central banks and currency boards. 
            Many challenges lie ahead for the banking sector in the SEE countries which, 
overall, remains less developed relative to the Central Eastern European transition 
countries. Table 3 depicts improvements in the SEE countries’ banking sector over 
the past 6 years, according to the EBRD Index of Banking System Reform. According 
to this index, the banking system reform in all SEE countries ranges between 2.3 and 
3.3
12. 
Table 3: SEE Countries' Banking System Reform Index 
   Year  





















Source: EBRD Transition Report 2003 
 
  Bulgaria has recorded by far the largest improvement since the 1997-8 crisis, 
while FYR Macedonia and Romania have recorded very significant progress. 
Reforms in Albania and in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been implemented at a slower 
pace, while in Serbia and Montenegro reforms were first introduced after 2001 and 
since then changes are proceeding quite rapidly.  
7. Ownership Structure 
The privatisation of state owned banks was a critical element in the banking 
reform process. In all SEE countries there have been serious delays mainly due to 
                                                           
12 EBRD Transition Report 2003, p.17. The classification 3 means ‘there has been progress in 
establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervision and regulation, while 
there is significant lending to private enterprises and significant presence of private banks’.   21
government reluctance, unfavourable political circumstances and general economic 
uncertainty.  
  Table 4 presents the asset shares of state owned banks. While in the 1990s the 
privatisation process proceeded rather slowly, over the last six years it has increased 
dramatically. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia and Bulgaria, the asset share 
of state-owned banks dropped below 15%. In Albania, the privatisation of the 
Albanian Savings Bank in 2003 lowered the percentage share of state owned banks 
below 10%, while in Romania the government plans to reduce further its stake in 
Banca Commerciala Romana (BCR) and significantly lower the percentage share of 
state owned banks in total bank assets. The privatisation process has been delayed in 
Serbia and Montenegro since the transition process started only after 2001.  
Table 4: SEE Countries' Bank Ownership Structure I 











2002 35.6%  FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) 
2003 37.5% 
1998 1.4% 
2002 2.0%  FYR Macedonia 
2003 1.8% 
1998 75.3% 
2002 43.6%  Romania 
2003 41.5% 
Greece 2003  49.0% 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports 2003; Annual Reports 2003 from the Central Banks of Greece, 
Romania, Serbia/Montenegro 
 
Table 5 below presents the extent of foreign ownership of banking institutions 
in the SEE countries. With the exception of Serbia and Montenegro, privatisation and 
the liberalisation of the banking sector were characterised by the entry of foreign 
banks in the market. Typically, entry occurred by either acquisition of local banks   22
(state owned or private) or establishment of their own subsidiaries or branches. Their 
presence must be considered important, since they introduce modern organisational 
and management techniques and much needed financial market know-how. Foreign 
ownership is dominant in almost all SEE countries. For instance, in Albania, almost 
all the banking sector is foreign-owned.  
Table 5: SEE Countries' Bank Ownership Structure II 




Foreign Owned Banks 
1998 10  8 
2002 13  12  Albania 
2003 16  14 
2000 55  n/a 
2002 40  n/a  Bosnia-Herzegovina 
2003 37  n/a 
1998 34  17 
2002 34  26  Bulgaria 
2003 35  27 
1998 104  3 
2002 50  12  FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) 
2003 47  16 
1998 24  6 
FYR Macedonia 
2002 20  7 
1998 36  16 
2002 39  24  Romania 
2003 38  21 
Greece 2003  59  20 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2003; Central Banks Annual Report 2003 of the respective countries 
 
8. Capitalisation 
  During the initial phase of transition, many banks became insolvent under the 
weight of non-performing loans, while others were kept operating with Capital 
Adequacy Ratios (CARs) much below 8%, the regulatory minimum according to the 
Basle Capital Adequacy Agreement rules. The restructuring of state owned banks and 
the capital injections received from their respective governments improved bank 
capitalisation significantly. As table 6 shows the private banks that entered the market 
in the following years were on average well-capitalised and maintained high CAR.    23
 
During the last six years, all operating banks - both private and public - have 
improved their CAR. In all countries, banks are now on average well capitalised, 
recording ratios well above the regulatory minimum (8%). In Albania, Bulgaria and 
Romania, the regulatory minimum CAR is 12%, following the severe financial crises 
during the 90’s. The regulatory authorities in these countries are expected to reduce 
the minimum CAR to 8% in the near future, after the banking system has been 
stabilised and considered sufficiently capitalised. It is more than likely that in the near 
future, the CAR will fall to lower levels (albeit above the regulatory minimum) given 
the intention of banks to increase their lending.  
Table 6: SEE Countries' Banks Capitalisation 






1998    




















2002 24.6%  Romania 
2003 20.0% 
12.0% 
Greece 2003  12.8%  8.0% 
EU Large Banks  2003S  11.4%  8.0% 
Source: Central Banks Annual Reports 1998, 2002, 2003 of the respective countries; Bloomberg 
Consolidated Fiscal Statements 2003. 
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9. Profitability 
  The profitability of the banking sector, has improved steadily over the past six 
years. This was the result of reform implementation regarding the adjustment of non-
performing loans, the introduction of modern banking techniques and the increasing 
pace of credit expansion. The table below presents two indexes of bank profitability, 
the Return on Assets (ROA) and the Return on Equity (ROE).  
Table 7: SEE Countries' Bank Profitability  
   Year   ROA  ROE 
1998 -1.8%  -82.3% 
2002 1.2%  19.1%  Albania 
2003 1.2%  19.5% 
2000 -1.5%  -5.8% 
2002 0.4%  3.2%  Bosnia-Herzsegovina 
2003 0.7%  6.4% 
1998 1.7%  15.8% 
2002 2.7%  19.2%  Bulgaria 
2003 2.0%  18.4% 
1998 n/a n/a 
FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) 
2002 -0.7%  -3.2% 
FYR Macedonia  1998  2.0%  8.2% 
   2002  1.5%  6.9% 
   2003  1.7%  8.8% 
1998 0.1%  1.0% 
Romania 
2002 2.7%  19.7% 
Greece 2003  0.9%  12.8% 
EU Large Banks  2003S  0.4%  11.4% 
Source: Central Banks Annual Reports 1998,2002, 2003 of the respective countries; 
Bloomberg Consolidated Fiscal Statements 2003. 
 
  By 2002, both ratios had increased to the point of exceeding the corresponding 
figures for the average EU large banks. This was the result of selective lending 
practices banks and the wide interest-rate spread. In the future, banks will likely have 
to find new sources of profits as market conditions change. Intermediation is expected 
to increase together with competition between banks, leading to a narrowing of 
interest-rate spreads. Financial institutions should seek new sources of revenue in   25
retail banking and in asset management, while they will try to increase market share. 
Some of the key factors determining the SEE bank performance in the future are: 
•  controlling of operating expenses and minimising losses; 
•  implementation of a clear strategy to optimise capital allocation;  
•  introduction of new banking products and services; 
•  optimisation of human resources capabilities; 
•  introduction of modern and effective risk management techniques;  
•  a clearly defined segmentation of their target client base; and,  
•  increasing market share. 
            These factors are identical to those that affect the performance of banking 
institutions in the more advanced economies as well, and this is a clear sign as to how 
far the banking sector in SEE countries has come during the past few years. 
10. Loan Portfolio Quality 
  During the 1990s, the banking system of the SEE countries experienced 
serious problems stemming mainly from the poor quality of their loan portfolios. 
Most of these problems were inherited from the ‘old regime’, where credit risk 
evaluation was irrelevant, the regulatory framework was inefficient and a bank’s 
credit policy was just a government instrument used according to the needs of the 
centrally planned economy (Bonin 2001:1).  
During the transition period and especially during the last six years, banking 
institutions took measures to improve their asset quality and loan portfolio 
performance. Concurrent with the privatisation and restructuring policies carried out 
by specially created agencies, the central banks adopted new methods, rules and 
regulations according to BIS standards in order to create a new and effective 
framework to deal with lingering functional and supervision problems. Table 8 below 
presents the loan portfolio quality of commercial banks in SEE countries.   
With the exception of Serbia and Montenegro and FYR Macedonia, loan 
portfolio quality has improved substantially in all the SEE countries. In FYR 
Macedonia, the banking sector crisis and the economic downturn of 2001 were the 
main causes of a further delay in dealing with the non-performing loan adjustment. In 
Serbia and Montenegro, the economy is only now recovering from the war and most   26
of the banks still have a large number of non-performing loans in their portfolios 
inherited from the past. 
Table 8: SEE Countries' Bank Loan Portfolio Quality 
   Year   Non-Performing Loans/ 



















Greece 2003  5.4% 
EU Large Banks  2002  2.7% 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports 2000, 2003; Bloomberg Consolidated Fiscal 
Statements 2003 
 
  Overall, the share of non-performing loans to the total loan portfolio is still 
high compared to large EU banks. The introduction of modern and more sophisticated 
risk management techniques and the introduction and implementation of the new 
Basel II Accord are two of the measures expected to improve loan portfolio quality 
and accelerate convergence toward the EU average.  
11. Financial Intermediation 
Financial intermediation remained low during the first decade of transition, 
mainly due to weak depositor confidence caused by the protracted and, in some cases, 
severe financial crises experienced by most SEE economies. During the same period, 
legal protection for depositors and deposit insurance schemes were absent. In 
addition, personal income was barely sufficient to cover basic needs. All these 
conditions combined to result in a low household savings potential and affected 
negatively credit expansion by banks. Additionally, during this period, lending policy 
was to move only slowly and carefully in the market given that corporate performance   27
was weak, balance sheets unreliable and clients’ credit history non-existent. The 
banks’ preferred option was to invest their funds in government bonds.  
  Table 9 presents data on the evolution of domestic credit to the private sector 
as a percentage of the GDP. Apart from Bulgaria, where the ratio is near 20%, in all 
the other countries the recorded ratio is indicative of the low level of financial 
intermediation.  
Table 9: SEE Countries' Banking System Intermediation 




















Greece 2003  26.3% 
EU 2002  48.5% 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports 2000, 2003; Bank of Greece Annual Report 2003. 
 
Over the last six years through 2004, the level of financial intermediation has 
increased significantly. The deposit base has increased together with depositor 
confidence while adequate legal protection of the lenders, the introduction of modern 
credit risk management techniques and the good and more transparent performance of 
the business sector has led to significant credit expansion. However, financial 
intermediation in all the SEE countries is still low relative to the EU average. 
According to a recent research conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003:20), the 
level of financial intermediation in SEE countries is also well below that of the 
Central and Eastern European countries. In the near future, however, as overall 
conditions improve, Balkan banks are expected to expand their lending activities in 
the retail, business and production sectors.    28
12. EU Countries’ Ownership in the SEE Countries’ Banking Sector 
Some of the largest European banking institutions as well as the five largest 
Greek banks
13 have ownership of SEE banks, taking advantage of their geographic 
and cultural proximity. Additionally, Greek banks following the expansion and 
operation of many national firms in the area expanded their own operations, hesitantly 
at the beginning and more aggressively during the second half of the 1990s and 
thereafter. Tables 10-15 present the market share of banks from selected European 
countries in the Balkan countries at the end of 2003. 
 
Table 10: BULGARIA 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN  PARENT BANK   SUBSIDIARIES/ BRANCH  MARKET SHARE 
(% of assets) 
EFG EUROBANK   BULGARIAN POST BANK  5.22% 
EMPORIKI BANK   EMPORIKI BANK 
BULGARIA
0.48% 
ALPHA BANK  BRANCH  0.69% 
PIRAEUS BANK  BRANCH  1.35% 
GREECE 
National Bank of Greece  UBB  10.42% 
Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt
HVB Bank Biochim  7.30% 
AUSTRIA 
Raiffesen Bank  Raiffesen Bank  5.30% 
FRANCE  SOCIETE GENERAL  Express Bank  3.90% 
ITALY UNICREDITO  Bulbank  17.50% 
Source: Central and Eastern European (CEE) Central Banking Sector Report, RZB, Oct 2004; On Greek banks: 
Published Results by the respective institutions. 
 
 
Table 11: ROMANIA 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN  PARENT BANK   SUBSIDIARIES /BRANCH  MARKET SHARE 
(% of assets) 
EFG EUROBANK  BANC POST  4.22% 
EMPORIKI BANK  EMPORIKI BANK 
ROMANIA
0.37% 
ALPHA BANK  ALPHA BANK ROMANIA  3.67% 
National Bank of Greece  BANCA ROMANEASCA  1.07% 









HVB Bank Romania  3.40% 
AUSTRIA 
Raiffesen Bank  Raiffesen Bank  6.90% 
FRANCE SOCIETE  GENERAL BRD  13.20% 
Source: Central and Eastern European (CEE) Central Banking Sector Report, RZB, Oct 2004; On Greek banks: 
Published Results by the respective institutions.
                                                           
13 There is a strong connection between the size of banks and cross-border expansion since the business 
risk in the young markets of the Balkan countries can only be tolerated by large, viable and credible 
banking institutions.   29
Table 12: SERBIA&MONTENEGRO 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN  PARENT BANK  SUBSIDIARIES 
/BRANCH 
MARKET 
SHARE (% of 
assets) 
EFG EUROBANK  EUROBANK BEOGRAD  0.25% 
GREECE 




Serbia&Montenegro  0.20% 
AUSTRIA 
Raiffesen Bank  Raiffesen Bank  8.50% 
FRANCE  SOCIETE GENERAL  SOCIETE GENERAL  3.20% 
Source: Central and Eastern European (CEE) Central Banking Sector Report, RZB, Oct 2004; On Greek 




Table 13: (F.Y.R) Macedonia 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN  PARENT BANK  SUBSIDIARIES 
/BRANCH 
MARKET 
SHARE (% of 
assets) 
ALPHA BANK  ALPHA BANK SKOPIE  2.80% 
GREECE  National Bank of 
Greece  STOPANSKA BANKA  26.40% 
SOLVENIA* NLB  TUTUNSKA  11.30% 
FYROM -  KOMERCIJALNA 
BANKA  28.50% 
Source: Central and Eastern European (CEE) Central Banking Sector Report, RZB, Oct 2004; On Greek 
banks: Published Results by the respective institutions. 





Table 14: ALBANIA 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN  PARENT BANK   SUBSIDIARIES 
/BRANCH 
MARKET 
SHARE (% of 
assets) 
EMPORIKI BANK   EMPORIKI BANK 
ALBANIA  1.18% 
ALPHA BANK  BRANCH  7.36% 
PIRAEUS BANK  TIRANA BANK  7.05% 
GREECE 
National Bank of 
Greece  BRANCH 2.23% 
AUSTRIA  Raiffesen Bank  Savings Bank  49.10% 
ITALY  Banca Di Roma  Banka ItaloAlbanese  4.40% 
Source: Central and Eastern European (CEE) Central Banking Sector Report, RZB, Oct 2004; On Greek 
banks: Published Results by the respective institutions. 
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Table 15: Bosnia-Herzegovina 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN  PARENT BANK   SUBSIDIARIES 
/BRANCH 
MARKET 
SHARE (% of 
assets) 
Raiffesen Bank  Raiffesen Bank  19.90% 
Hypo Alpe-Adria  Hypo Alpe-Adria  16.20%  AUSTRIA 
Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt  HVB Bank BACA  7.90% 
ITALY Unicredito  Zagrebacka  Banca  16.80% 
Source: Central and Eastern European (CEE) Central Banking Sector Report, RZB, Oct 2004; On Greek 
banks: Published Results by the respective institutions. 
 
  Tables 10-15 above indicate that a number of European banks have become 
prominent players in the Balkan market. In Bulgaria, their market share in 2003, in 
terms of total banking assets, was about 52%, in Romania about 34%, while in 
Albania and FYR Macedonia they dominated the market, controlling over 65% of 
total assets. The presence of European banks in Serbia and Montenegro is rather small 
(about 15%), but numerous commercial banks have already declared their intention 
and their plans to expand into that country. 
  The strong economic growth recorded in all the Balkan countries, the 
increasing financial stability, the improved corporate results, the increasing disposable 
income and the expansion of consumer credit provide a dynamic banking 
environment with favourable conditions for the operation of European banks. All of 
them, according to their most recent annual reports expect to increase their market 
share and lending activity in the foreseeable future. 
13. Conclusion 
The data and information presented in this study provide strong evidence that 
there have been rigorous and accelerated improvements in the banking sector of the 
Balkan countries, particularly after the acute crises that affected them between 1996 
and 2000. Our review suggests that government reforms in recent years radically 
changed the ownership structure of the banking system and improved performance 
indicators. Moreover, a very significant harmonisation of ownership structure and 
performance indicators has been emerging in all the Balkan countries. This manifests 
a common convergence pattern despite the fact that the transformation drive in each 
country proceeded at different speed and by different method (Buch 1996). Overall, 
with the exception of a low level of intermediation, in all other respects the banking   31
sectors in the Balkan countries resemble those of EU countries. To a great extent, this 
progress has been achieved because of the efforts of foreign investors. The Balkan 
experience shows that foreign investments, if concentrated collectively, timely and in 
a synchronised manner on a particular economic sector, can effectively redefine its 
structure and function.  
  Despite these significant developments in the past few years, the banking 
sector in the Balkans still faces many challenges. A new wave of reforms 
concentrating on sector consolidation through mergers and acquisitions is needed and, 
in some countries, is already under way. Deposit insurance schemes and loan 
collateral policies recently introduced are welcoming measures protecting both banks 
and their clients. The full implementation of the new Basel II Accord and the 
strengthening of the regulatory framework are also challenges requiring further 
action. It should also be noted in this context that the sustainability of banking sector 
reform in SEE countries will be determined, to a considerable extent, by the 
commitment of governments to implement market-oriented reforms in other sectors of 
the economy. Many weaknesses and problems, past and present, faced by the banking 
system are caused by the lack of transparency and accountability in public and private 
transactions, the negative consequences of the underground economy, the legacy of 
weak corporate governance and the lack of public confidence in public institutions. 
Last but not least, there are clear signs that banking reform is already 
contributing to the broader objective of the Balkan countries to integrate in the EU. 
Ownership structure alone reveals a de facto strong continental integration pattern. 
This momentum should be seized as an opportunity by the EU to intensify the 
Stabilisation and Association Process of the Balkan countries instead of treating these 
advancements as a test ground and as a criterion for deciding their accession prospects 
in the distant future.  
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